Why do large firms in Japan hold small percentages of stock in trading partners? A firm that holds stock in a trading partner weakens its own bargaining position, for a portion of its own gain from trade then includes a share interest in the partner's gain from trade. But precisely for this reason the firm can at any time penalize the trading partner by divesting its share interest. Cross-shareholding therefore strengthens the penalties for opportunism and this may be its purpose. Opportunism here means substituting products of lower quality than claimed or misrepresenting investments that lower the other party's costs. Econometric analysis of the pattern of cross-shareholding within Japan's keiretsu groups in 1980 reveals evidence that is consistent with this argument. (J.E.L. classifications: D23, G30, L14) I thank Nanzan University for permission to use its Nikkei financial data tape for this project. Also, for comments on earlier drafts of this paper I thank
2 1984), or else to prevent hostile stock raiders from abrogating a firm's long-term contracts (Ramseyer, 1987; Aoki, 1987; Sheard, 1991) . The anti-takeover theory is a leading theory of keiretsu cross-shareholding largely because of the extreme infrequency in Japan of hostile takeovers. Because takeovers are so rare the notion is widely held that takeover defenses have been effective, and cross-shareholding has appeared to many to be such a defense. But it is far from obvious that crossshareholding in fact is an effective takeover defense; why should institutional shareholders be any less reluctant than other shareholders to tender their shares in the event of an enriching bid? Perhaps takeovers have been rare in Japan not because defenses are effective but because the potential gains from successful takeovers are small. At the least, validation of the anti-takeover theory of cross-shareholding awaits further empirical investigation, for instance relating the pattern of crossshareholding to the likelihood of hostile takeover bids and to cross-shareholdings' relative effectiveness as a takeover defense.
In the externality theory, firms affiliate with one another in order to internalize the gains from activities with potential spillover effects. For instance if advertising by one firm benefits other firms that have its same trademark, then this very fact both induces firms to establish common trademarks with other firms and to hold shares in the other firms (Hadley, 1970 ; pp. 247-8, 253-4). Besides advertising, the activity with spillovers could be research and development or the collection and dissemination of information (Goto, 1982) .
In the successive monopoly theory, firms that have market power and are trading partners establish share interlocks to induce one another to set prices or orders for production that are in their common interest as opposed to one's selfish interest (Caves and Uekusa, 1976; Fung, 1991) .
It 
